Explains the intersubjective nature of the self and the function of role taking in the development of the personal level of intersubjectivity out of primordial, pre-personal sociality or corporeal intersubjectivity of the lived body. Pragmatic philosophy of George Herbert Mead; Existential-phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty; Fundamental and pervasive rapport; More.

This is the first book to offer the best essays, articles, and speeches on ethics and intelligence that demonstrate the complex moral dilemmas in intelligence collection, analysis, and operations. Some are recently declassified and never before published, and all are written by authors whose backgrounds are as varied as their insights, including Robert M. Gates, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; John P. Langan, the Joseph Cardinal Bernardin Professor of Catholic Social Thought at the Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown (...) University; and Loch K. Johnson, Regents Professor of Political Science at the University of Georgia and recipient of the Owens Award for contributions to the understanding of U.S. intelligence activities. Creating the foundation for the study of ethics and intelligence by filling in the gap between warfare and philosophy, this is a valuable collection of literature for building an ethical code that is not dependent on any specific agency, department, or country. (shrink)

This work runs counter to the traditional interpretations of Peirce's philosophy by eliciting an inherent strand of pragmatic pluralism that is embedded in the very core of his thought and that weaves his various doctrines into a systematic ...

Using classical American pragmatism, the authors provide a philosophical framework for rethinking the nature of the corporation--how it is embedded in its natural, technological, cultural, and international environments, emphasizing throughout its pervasive relational and moral dimensions. They explore the relationship of this framework to other contemporary business ethics perspectives, as well as its implications for moral leadership in business and business education.

Dewey's understanding of growth is inseparably intertwined with his distinctively pragmatic understanding of the self-community relation and of knowledge as experimental. Within this framework, growth emerges as a process by which individual communities achieves fuller, richer, more inclusive, and more complex interactions with their environment by incorporating the perspective of "the other". Growth involves reintegration of problematic situations in ways which lead to expansion of self, of community, and of the relation between the two. In this way growth and workability (...) go hand in hand, for growth involves the resolution of conflict through reconstructive expansion of contexts which work in bringing about the desired resolution. And in this way growth and workability properly understood in their concrete fullness are inherently moral, and the ethical dimension of business decisions involves consideration of both. In this sense, pragmatism can hold that the ultimate goal in the nurturing of moral maturity, whether for individuals, communities, or corporations, is the development of the ability for ongoing self-directed growth. (shrink)

C. I. Lewis was one of the most important thinkers of his generation. In this book, Sandra B. Rosenthal explores Lewis’s philosophical vision, and links his thought to the traditions of classical American pragmatism. Tracing Lewis’s influences, she explains the central concepts informing his thinking and how he developed a unique and practical vision of the human experience. She shows how Lewis contributed to the enrichment and expansion of pragmatism, opening new paths of constructive dialogue with other traditions. This (...) book will become a standard reference for readers who want to know more about one of American philosophy’s most distinguished minds. (shrink)

The empirical-normative split in business ethics is another manifestation of the fact-value problem that has existed betweenscience and philosophy for several centuries. This paper explores classical American pragmatism’s understanding of the fact-valuedistinction, showing how it offers a different way of understanding the empirical business ethics–normative business ethics issue.Unfolding the pragmatic perspective on this issue involves a focus on its understanding of both the nature of empirical inquiry and thenature of normative inquiry.

Peirce’s pragmatic stress on meaning in terms of habits of response is, of course, well known. However, the language in which it is usually expressed tends too often to conflate its epistemic and ontological dimensions, thereby hiding from view its full systematic significance. The following discussion will focus on the emergence of such meanings as epistemic relational structures which embody the characteristics of the dynamics of organism-environment interaction in their very internal structure and which lead outward toward the universe, providing (...) an experienced content which is at once epistemic and ontological. (shrink)

Dewey's understanding of growth is inseparably intertwined with his distinctively pragmatic understanding of the self-community relation and of knowledge as experimental. Within this framework, growth emerges as a process by which individual communities achieves fuller, richer, more inclusive, and more complex interactions with their environment by incorporating the perspective of "the other". Growth involves reintegration of problematic situations in ways which lead to expansion of self, of community, and of the relation between the two. In this way growth and workability (...) go hand in hand, for growth involves the resolution of conflict through reconstructive expansion of contexts which work in bringing about the desired resolution. And in this way growth and workability properly understood in their concrete fullness are inherently moral, and the ethical dimension of business decisions involves consideration of both. In this sense, pragmatism can hold that the ultimate goal in the nurturing of moral maturity, whether for individuals, communities, or corporations, is the development of the ability for ongoing self-directed growth. (shrink)

Peirce’s pragmatic stress on meaning in terms of habits of response is, of course, well known. However, the language in which it is usually expressed tends too often to conflate its epistemic and ontological dimensions, thereby hiding from view its full systematic significance. The following discussion will focus on the emergence of such meanings as epistemic relational structures which embody the characteristics of the dynamics of organism-environment interaction in their very internal structure and which lead outward toward the universe, providing (...) an experienced content which is at once epistemic and ontological. (shrink)

This collection provides a thorough grounding in the philosophy of American pragmatism by examining the views of four principal thinkers - Charles S. Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead - on issues of central and enduring importance to life in human society. Pragmatism emerged as a characteristically American response to an inheritance of British empiricism. Presenting a radical reconception of the nature of experience, pragmatism represents a belief that ideas are not merely to be contemplated but must (...) be put into action, tested and refined through experience. At the same time, the American pragmatists argued for an emphasis on human community that would offset the deep-seated American bias in favor of individualism. Far from being a relic of the past, pragmatism offers a dynamic and substantive approach to questions of human conduct, social values, scientific inquiry, religious belief, and aesthetic experience that lie at the center of contemporary life. This volume is an invaluable introduction to a school of thought that remains vital, instructive, and provocative. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION In the philosophic world today, and especially within the context of the emerging American scene, pragmatism and phenomenology can each ...

LEWIS’s philosophy is most frequently linked with linguistic conventionalism and is interpreted as reductivistic in its theory of meaning and anti-metaphysical both in spirit and in specific content. Indeed, Lewis is often considered to represent a turning point in American philosophy, marking the beginning of its move away from classical American pragmatism and toward the analytic tradition—either the Vienna Circle type of positivism and constructionalism or the British ordinary language analysis of the post Wittgenstenian variety. True, Lewis is a pragmatist (...) of sorts—a pragmatic analyst. Such a standard script leads inevitably to the fashionable conclusion that there is "something very wrong" with his thought—his construction of objects out of sense-data does not work; his doctrine of the given is self-contradictory, etc. Thus, Lewis’s position becomes significant as an historical lesson in how not to construct one’s analytic philosophy. And, indeed, the fashionable conclusion is, in a certain sense, quite right. His "analytic philosophy" is open to all sorts of reasonable objections by reasonable critics. However, Lewis’s position yields such inadequate analytic philosophy precisely because his pragmatic position does not have its philosophic kinship with the analytic tradition but rather is permeated both in spirit and in content by the tradition of classical American pragmatism. (shrink)

Mead's pragmatic focus on habit as the foundation of meaning is usually viewed in sharp contrast with Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological examination of meaning within experience. This paper attempts to show the way in which the explicit focus of each philosopher's position is latent within that of the other. For Mead and Merleau-Ponty alike, the content of human awareness at all levels is inseparably linked with the structure of human behavior. And, for both, such a structure is permeated throughout by the "living (...) meaning" of anticipatory habit or vital intentionality. (shrink)

Not only does peirce's theory of meaning as dispositional or as habit contain parallels with merleau-ponty's view of meaning in the structure of human behavior, but also both peirce and merleau-ponty alike attack reductivistic theories of perception. within this context, the present paper focuses on the use of kantian schemata in the philosophies of peirce and merleau-ponty, but to the extent that such incorporations are consistent with trends in pragmatism and phenomenology in general, it will reveal points of encounter not (...) just between peirce and merleau-ponty but between pragmatism and phenomenology in general. (shrink)

William James and John Dewey hold the view that all knowledge and experience are experimental. Within this common pragmatic context, James's theism and Dewey's atheism offer contrasting - indeed, contradictory - interpretations of the object of religious experience. This essay explores the intertwining of their common pragmatic context and differing objects of religious belief to show the way in which this intertwining gives rise to a unique position which can appeal to theists and atheists alike.

William James and John Dewey hold the view that all knowledge and experience are experimental. Within this common pragmatic context, James's theism and Dewey's atheism offer contrasting - indeed, contradictory - interpretations of the object of religious experience. This essay explores the intertwining of their common pragmatic context and differing objects of religious belief to show the way in which this intertwining gives rise to a unique position which can appeal to theists and atheists alike.

This essay examines the relationship of pierce's philosophy to idealism and realism in an attempt to show how such a relationship yields both a tool for bringing to light important distinctions and an obstacle which stands in the way of understanding his own unique position as one providing a distinctive metaphysics of pragmatism. The broad outlines of such an emerging pragmatic metaphysics are examined and interrelated.

One of the seemingly dominant traits of pragmatic thought is its “antimetaphysical” attitude. And, indeed, the general methodology of pragmatism may seem by its very nature to exclude the possibility of speculative philosophy, for any pragmatic metaphysics must be at once faithful to the limits of meaningfulness and knowledge imposed by a pragmatic epistemology and in harmony with the scientific spirit of pragmatic philosophy in general. The following essay will examine a pragmatic methodology for metaphysics as it emerges when the (...) philosophies of C. S. Peirce and C. I. Lewis are used for mutual clarification. It is not here held that all pragmatists would accept the methodology which will emerge from such a mutual clarification; neither is it held that no pragmatists other than Peirce or Lewis would accept it. Moreover, it is not held that either Peirce or Lewis consciously embraced it in its entirety. This, however, is not to say that the present procedure is arbitrary, for it is justifiable by the intelligibility of the methodology of metaphysics which emerges and the usefulness of this methodology in clarifying the systematic consistency of epistemology and metaphysics in a pragmatically oriented philosophy. Indeed, according to the basic doctrines of pragmatism, no other justification can be offered for this or any interpretive schema. (shrink)

Before developing a pragmatically based account of this interrelationship, the ensuing discussion will very briefly explore the positions of John Rawls, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Richard Rorty to elicit certain relevant features. As a sketchy caricature, and with all the dangers sketchy caricatures involve, it can be said that Rawls' position exemplifies the individual as the source of important community arrangements, MacIntyre's the individual as the product of community arrangements, and Rorty's the freeing of the issue from ontological entanglements and presumptions.

THE CONCEPT OF WORLD IN LEWIS'S PHILOSOPHY IS USUALLY\nTAKEN AS A COMMON-SENSE ONE INDICATING "WHAT IS THE CASE,"\nAND THEN IT IS NOTED THAT HIS STATEMENTS CONCERNING THE\nWORLD ARE INCONSISTENT WITH HIS PRAGMATICALLY ORIENTED\nPOSITION AS A WHOLE. HOWEVER, LEWIS'S CONCEPT OF WORLD IS A\nPRECISE TECHNICAL CONCEPT WHICH PROVIDES AN IMPORTANT KEY\nTO THE SYSTEMATIC UNITY OF HIS CONCEPTUAL PRAGMATISM.\nTHOUGH METAPHYSICAL REALITY IS A CONCRETE ONGOING PROCESS\nFAR DIFFERENT FROM THE WORLD, THIS LEADS TO A PROBLEM ONLY\nTHROUGH A CONFUSION OF METAPHYSICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL\nCATEGORIES; THE (...) WORLD IS BASICALLY A CONCEPT OF\nEPISTEMOLOGY. TO UNDERSTAND THE NATURE OF THE WORLD IS TO\nUNDERSTAND THE NATURE OF THAT PRECISE ENCOMPASSING\nSTRUCTURE WHICH EMERGES FROM THE APPLICATION OF AN ABSTRACT\nCONCEPTUAL SYSTEM TO THE CONCRETE PROCESS AND WHICH, AS A\nPRODUCT OF THE LOGICAL INTERACTION OF BOTH, IS IN FACT\nIDENTICAL WITH NEITHER. (shrink)